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From Medieval to Renaissance:
Paradigm Shifts and Artistic Problems
in English Renaissance Drama
by

John Boni
Colorado State University

In describing the change from Medieval to Renaissance, Theodore
Spencer writes:
There finally came a time when realism, at first
connected inextricably with religion, was used
for its own sake. What we call the Renaissance
began at that moment. 1
For Spencer, "realism" denotes an increased concern with depicting the
actual world itself. As an illustration, one may cite the exclamation attributed to Paolo Uccello, "What a wonderful thing is this perspective!",
an exclamation over a technique which aided him in more accurate representation of the world as he had begun to perceive it.
This shift toward a closer depiction of the world as perceived (a somewhat circular expression, I realize) is commented upon by Harry E.
Berger, Jr.:
To the medieval artist, E. H . Gombrich writes
in Art and Illusion, "the schema is the image;
to the post-medieval artist, it is the starting
point for corrections, adjustments, adaptations,
the means to probe reality and to wrestle with
the particular." And he suggests that the schematic style of the former is due not simply to
technical inadequacy but to a belief in the superior reality of generic over specific forms.
Where the post-medieval artist asks, "How shall
'Theodore Spencer, Death and Elizabethan Tragedy (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press,
1936; rpt. New York: Pageant Books, 1960), p. 16.
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I render this lion as I see it, or have seen it, in
nature?," the medieval artist corrects the particular image to approximate the schema, and
so far as the practical result is concerned the
motive may be indilferently stylistic or symbolic.•
Elaborating on this point, Berger describes Villard de Honnecourt's drawing of a lion (ca. 1235) which, though copied from life, "is sti.11 sufficiently
schematic to represent a lion rather than to resemble this lion. " 3 That is,
Honnecourt, in spite of the fact that he was using a real lion as a model,
was unable to particularize. Honnecourt's perception and therefore his
practice remained restricted by certain givens, factors which extend far
beyond the narrow meaning of the term "style." To use Gombrich's valuable pairing, at this point the generic dominated the specific.
Such givens as those which dominated Honnecourt, such controlling
concepts, are difficult to throw off. Gombrich notes "the tenacity of conventions ... the enormous pull in man to repeat what he has learned," and
he quotes Vasari on Stefano's early attempts at perspective:

I

Although the foreshortenings which he made
are faulty in manner . . . yet, as the first investigator of these difficulties, he deserves much
greater fame than do those who follow after
him with a more orderly and regulated style.•

Vasari understood the problems of a forerunner, an artist or thinker who,
as we put it, attempts a breakthrough. From another field of thoughts, we
have Einstein's gracious tribute to ewton:
ewton forgive me; you found the only way
which, in your age, was just about possible for
a man of highest thought and creative power.
The concepts which you created are even today
still guiding our thinking in physics, although
we now know that they wi.11 have to be replaced
by others ... •
'Harry E. Berger, Jr., .. Ecology of the Medieval Imagination: An Introductory Overview,"'
Centennial Review, 12 (1968), 30S--9. The quotation from Combrich can be found in Arland
Illusion (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969), p. 173.
'Berger, "Ecology," p. 308.
'Art and Illusion, pp. 24-5, 11.
•Quoted in Max Jamme r, Concepts of Space (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954), p. 171.
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Einstein's perception complements Vasari's; both illustrate Gombrich's
remark on our tendency to follow that which has been established.
The shift from Medieval to Renaissance, the increased concern for
realism noted by Sp ncer, involved this move from the generic to the
specific. Gombrich asserts that the Renaissance artist's aim was to achieve
"the unique and unrepeatable experience the artist wishes to seize and
hold." H asser ts, "It is this constant search, this sacred discontent, which
constitutes the leaven of the Western mind since the Renaissance and
pervades our art no less than our science. " 0 Erwin Panofsky notes that
Renaissance theory served to "aid the artist in observation; Medieval theory consisted of rules to save the artist the trouble of direct observation." 7
Frederick Hartt comments on Pietro Lorenzetti's imperfect perspective
in his Birth of the Virgin (1342) and concludes, " onetheless the Sienese
Trecento painters, recklessly plunging into the hitherto unexplored realm
of the rational formulation of visible space, went a long way toward the
art of the Renaissance." 8 Hartt's colorful spatial metaphors, "recklessly
plunging," "hitherto unexplored realm," "a long way toward" imply several elements: the sense of an uncharted gap-a terra incognita of the
mind-between perception and practice in the two periods, and the sense
of leaving, breaking out of, light for darkness in the search for new light.
ow we know that it is not quite like that. No dark tunnel passes
between Medieval and Renaissance, nor, as we know equally well, does a
day define when the former ends and the latter begins (despite Spencer's
statement). umerous changes do occur, some small some great, some
successes and some failures, which finally cohere to a point at which we
decide a diJferent label becomes necessary to describe the characteristics
of human life and thought. A new period has begun, we decide. A useful
conceptualization of this problem basic to change-the pull of convention,
the difficulty of breaking away-is Thomas Kuhn's notion of the paradigm,
as enunciated in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.• Kuhn argues
that the paradigm is the epistemological entity which shapes scientific
thought and, consequently, scientific practice. He labels the occupation of
scientists "normal science," an attempt at problem or puzzle solving according to certain rules or givens. In Kuhn's terms these rules that govern
normal science within a scientific community constitute a paradigm. OnJy
at a point when the process of normal science begins to break down, to
fail at problem solving, and, by producing crises or anomalies, to call
attention to its shortcomings, will a paradigm be challenged. In short, it
'Art and ///usio11, p. 173.
'ENinPanofsky, '" Albrecht Oure r and Classical Antiquity," in Meo11i11ga11d the Visual Arts
, ' ' York: Doubleday Anchor, 1955), p. 278, n. 19.
'Frederick Hartt , History of lto/iar, Renaissance Ari (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
l!ll◄~ p. .
' Oiicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962; 2nd ed ., 1970).
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is no longer doing its job. At a subsequent stage the older paradigm may
be discarded in favor of a new one, and a new way of seeing in this area
will have evolved. One notices that Kuhn's "paradigm" is a many-sided
concept. It represents an organizing principle which governs perception,
a way of seeing, new as well as old, a source of discoveries. Thus it is both
constriction and in its newer forms (or, in Kuhn's terms, its "revolutionary" aspects) possibility.10
ow Kuhn has claimed that the paradigm applies to the perceptions of
scientists but not to those of artists. 11 My disagreement on this point
requires some comment on Kuhn's restrictions, and implies the necessity
for a reevaluation of the historical approach to art, especially literary art.
It is useful to begin with Kuhn's own caution, "The proponents of
competing paradigms are always at least slightly at cross purposes," 12 for
it applies to our area of disagreement. Correlations between science and
art, always difficult to make, in recent years have seemed increasingly so.
Kuhn's dismissal of any science-art nexus reHects his own scientific valueparadigm. For instance, he writes, "Unlike art, science destroys its past,"
and "How can an artist accept Rembrandt (say) but feel his tradition, his
method, style is dead?" He further asserts that although Ingres' Odalisque
is only another (after that of Matisse) "one does not stop looking."'" What
one must first perceive here is the value-base of Kuhn's assertion: quantity
and utility represent the keys. After all, given one Odalisque why paint
another? Or, if Rembrandt's style is now out-of-date (is it?) why study it?
By a strained analogy Kuhn has a point. One may study the work of
early scientists (as he has) but not in order to produce new science; one
need not replicate an experiment, product, or discovery as an end-in-itself.
Were the ends of art only or even primarily utilitarian, quantitative, we
would cede Kuhn his victory. On the other hand, one admits that certain
artists, with good reason, are labelled derivative, unoriginal, and relegated
to the second or third rank. These men have produced only another
Odalisque. Having admitted that, one must also acknowledge that several
paintings, plays, etc. on the same subject or theme are not of necessity
merely replicative. Their authors need not be ipso facto, mere derivative
imitators. While the combination of chlorine and water must always produce hydrochloric acid, artistic meditation on the issue of evil need not
produce only or always an Othello. In short, Kuhn may be right, but his
conclusions are terribly limited.
Kuhn's other major objection concerns process as much as product:
1
•1n her essay, "The ature of a Paradigm," Margaret Masterman defines twenty-one separate meanings in Kuhn's uses of the term. See Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed.
lmre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 59-89.
''Thomas Kuhn, "Comment [on the Relation of Science and Art)," Comparative Studies In
Society and lli$10ry, 11 (1969), 403-412.
"Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 148.
""Comment [on the Relation of Science and Art]," pp. 407, 408, 409.
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Whatever the term "aesthetic" may mean, the
artist's goal is the production of aesthetic objects; technical puzzles are what he must resolve in order to produce such objects. For the
scientist, on the other hand, the solved technical puzzle is the goal, and the aesthetic is a tool
for its attainment. Whether in the realm of
products or of activities, what are ends for the
artist are means for the scientist, and vice
versa."
Annunciation of so precise a relationship should put us on guard immediately. Must an aesthetic object (whatever that is) be different from a technical puzzle? In Kuhn 's categories, yes. However, one might argue that a
finished work of art also exists as a solved technical puzzle-with, as we
said before, far different ends from those intended by a scientist. That is,
though the results are aesthetic-pleasing and stimulating to mind,imagination, senses-rather than utilitarian-performing a speci6.c functionthe artist's solution of technical puzzles of form and structure represents
part of his success.
The discrepancy in ends-aesthetic as opposed to utilitarian-brings us
to what may be the underlying issue: the problem of veri6.cation, or, if you
will, judgement. Given the ends of science, verifiability becomes almost
a matter of course: does it work (i.e. perform the predicted operation)? Is
its work useful, according to agreed upon criteria? Is it replicable? The
process of science is man working directly on nature, and its ends material
(or positivistic) conclusions.
o such fixed criteria govern in art. Schools based on differing value
systems may exist contemporaneously; new critics become old critics, so
that not all achievements are judged alike. One, for example, cannot
pronounce a representational sculpture better than a nonrepresentational
one on the grounds that the former more accurately depicts human
anatomy. or does reference to outmoded governmental theories vitiate
the worth of Shakespeare's history plays. On the other band, one must
allow ~be basis for Kuhn's argument. Where lies the verifiability of art?
And as a consequence, if such does not exist, how does an artist perceive
crises, anomalies, and realize that the paradigm he works with may be
incomplete? Given the orientation of Kuhn's system, we cannot easily
shrug off his assertions.
At this point, then, let us take a closer look at some of Kuhn's assertions.
Margaret Masterman's analysis of the many meanings of "paradigm" in
Kuhn's work has been cited previously. One can, at the least, identify
Kuhnian paradigm sub-a and Kuhnian paradigm sub-b (though I will drop
these cumbersome labels). The former is paradigm as a metaphysical per" '" Comment," p. 405.

50

John Boni

ceptual base. The latter is paradigm as scientific tool, basis for normal
science. Kuhn tries to focus on the latter; he is concerned with the uniqueness of the scientific process and product, with the existence of scientific
communities, conducting normal science from a common paradigm or
paradigms.
onetheless, he mentions the former category of paradigm in ways
strikingly germane to the problems of artistic perception, or, if you will,
of human perception at large. He says:
What I have been opposing in this book is therefore the attempt, traditional since Descartes
but not before, to analyze perception as an interpretive process, an unconscious version of
what we do after we have perceived.15
In the above lines Kuhn 's perspective embraces issues wider than scientific endeavor. ot surprisingly, in another passage Kuhn makes analogies
with well-known experiments in perception. "The duck-rabbit experiment shows that two men with the same retinal impressions can see
different things." (fhis figure is a favorite of Gombrich also.) In speaking
of attempts to develop "an actual language of observation," Kuhn concludes, " o language thus restricted to reporting a world fully known in
advance can produce mere neutral and objective reports on 'the
given. ' "'•The implications of this interesting comment go far beyond the
operations of normal science. Kuhn's speculations on language remain
tentative, perhaps in part because he feels uncomfortable with the subject, and more certainly because of his tacit desire to separate scientific
epistemology from what he wishes to see as "other kinds." However, as
the preceding quotations reflect, accepting Kuhn's basic assertions (his
paradigm?), a greater homogeneity exists than he will allow.
If we acknowledge Kuhn's truism about language as vehicle of thought,
and the impossibility of a value-free language, we then accept the notion
of paradigms limiting expressive possibilities for many artists ,is they do for
many scientists. At this point, we have arrived at a formula for historical
paralysis, since no allowance has been made for change. Having admitted
the lack of verifiability in art, we cannot cite crises or anomalies as the basis
for change. evertheless, we realize there is change-some would say
progress-in the arts. We may, with some confidence, assert a dialectical
relationship between artist and paradigm in the matter of form and of
content. Those whom we do not label "derivative," though they may be
painting another Odalisque or writing another play exploring human evil,
are those who take a form, an idea, to more revealing levels of expression.
"Structure p. 195.
"Structure pp. 126-7.
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Consequently, we begin to see the problems involved with paradigm
shifts, the problems artists encounter when they "plunge recklessly into
unexplored realms," in Frederick Hartt's terms. It is, in one case, the
problem of moving from Medieval to Renaissance, from generic to specific. Renaissance playwrights in England re8ected such an attempted
shift as they became more concerned with the interior processes of their
characters-what we today label as psychological motivation.
As the drama became more secular in England, the emphasis on a
character's inner life intensified. A key shift in perspective from the classical to the Christian lay in the new emphasis on a character's ability (and
responsibility) to control his fate. 17 As the Christian concern with free will
and conscience had its effect on the drama, character became a major
determinant: A man's acts, the results of his moral choice, controlled his
destiny. Thus in medieval English morality plays the focus is on the soul
in con8ict between the demands of good and evil. The sketch of the set
for The Castle of Perseverance depicting the soul or castle besieged by
various sins provides a striking visual instance of this particular schema.
Looked at closely, this conllict constitutes a meeting of external and
internal forces. While it re8ected the soul under pressure of choice, that
pressure came from evil. Despite the Augustinian concept of evil as privative, the absence of good, evil was expressed-both dramatically and
homiletically-as active. Although the Christian outlook emphasized
moral responsibility by focusing on the consequences of one's moral
choice, Medieval drama still tended to depict character as a given, rarely
concerning itself with change in character. orman Rabkin points out that
the classical view of character as a fixed entity caused time to be a central
measure of action in classical drama. In the drama of the Renaissance, time
became less central as character assumed greater importance.
This contrast becomes clearer once we recall the theory and practice
of Ben Jonson, who stands out because of his strongly classical bent. This
base guided Jonson in drawing fixed characters, bound by humours into
narrowly psychological patterns, narrow ranges of possible choice. Such
characters, victims of their blindness, become butts of Jonson's satire because they violate their human intelligence. 18 Those characters who triumph in the scheme of Jonson's plays possess open, developed minds, or,
as Lovewit's name implies (in The Alchemist), a keen wit. Thus, in Jonson's
comedies, character is. We see little emphasis on change or on develop·
ment of character. Given this orientation of Jonson's vision, one may
speculate on the failure of his tragedies; he failed to develop the exploration of character necessary to tragedy in the period.
"See the Appendix, "Shakespearean Mimesis, English Drama, and the Unity of time." in
Norman Rabkin,Shakespearea11d theCQmmo11 Understandi11g New York: Free Press, 1967).
"Larry S. Champion, Ben Jonso11 s 'Dotages' (Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1967), p.
14.
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onetheless, Jonson does not reflect the norm. To define portrayal of
character and motive we might begin with Marlowe's Faustus. As we
recall, the progress of Faustus' decision to conjure is evoked, in part, by
the embodiments of the Good and Bad Angels. ow, in one sense, both
are emanations of Faustus' inner debate. They do resemble the psychomachia, that medieval depiction of the soul in confiict. However, two
points require consideration. First, Marlowe is attempting to depict the
mind in action, even if through traditional medieval devices. To show
Faustus approaching the decision to conjure, Marlowe employs soilloquy.
To represent the internal confiict, Marlowe employs externalized embodiments of Faustus' mental debate. Second, the theological and the psychological remain unintegrated. In his egotism, Faustus urges Mephistopheles
to admit that it was Faustus' own power which summoned him. But Mephistopheles responds, "Only per accidens, ... when we hear one rack the
name of God, we Hy to get his soul. " '" Good theology, perhaps, but a point
which emphasizes the power of the external-evil-over that of man's
decisions. Thus at the end Mephistopheles gloats with justification that he
tripped up Faustus.
In order to put Marlowe's attempt with Dr. Faustus in clearer perspective, we might consider some of his other characters. From the opening
of his play, Tamburlaine is fully developed, paralleling himself with Jove
and with monarchy in an early speech to Zenocrate. Until Act two, scene
five, Tamburlaine proclaims his greatness in public speeches meant to
convince a Zenocrate or a Theridamas of his worth. However, when the
minor ruler Cosroe and his aide Meander are leaving Tamburlaine, after
having secured his loyalty, Meander assures Cosroe:
Your majesty shall shortly have your wish,
And ride in triumph through Persepolis.
(11.5.48-49)

This casual statement motivates revelation ofTamburlaine's inner self; he
reacts thus:
And ride in triumph through Persepolis!ls it not brave to be a king, Techellesl
Usumcasane and Theridamas,
ls it not passing brave to be a king,
And ride in triumph through Persepolis?
(11.5.50-54)

The speech achieves a poignant revelation of the inner self of Tamburlaine, though not the inner processes. His reaction has been evoked by an
"All Marlowe references are to The Complete Works of Christopher Marlowe, ed.
Steane (Baltimore: Penguin, I 969).

J. 8 .
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external stimulus, Meander's line, which becomes a psychological refrain
for Tamburlaine. The Good Angel and Bad Angel, we may conclude,
represent an advance toward complexity and depth on Marlow's part over
this in Tamb11rlai11e.
In The Jew of Malta, Barabas presents himself at the start in soliloquy
(as Shakespeare's Richard III does). The character dimensions announced
here are never stretched further; Barabas does not change. In terms of
character, his fall occurs because he has violated the solitary and somewhat loving self he is. He demonstrates little in expanded awareness.
In Edward II, it is not Edward or his lover Gaveston who undergo
change. Rather Mortimer, initially the hothead, comes to understand the
demands of power. On the continent, after his escape from prison, Mortimer projects a new view of himself:
. . . Mortimer, reserv'd for better hap,
Has shaken off the thralldom of the Tower
(IV.2.43-44)
Shortly, he instructs the Queen:
ay, Madam, if you be a warrior,
You must not grow so passionate in speeches.
(IV.4.15-16)
Though he never seems terribly intelligent-his speeches at the end of the
play bear a textbookish quality- Mortimer has cunning enough to recognize necessity and to conform to its burdens. What reveals Marlowe's
limitations, though, is the fact that we see an early Mortimer and a later
Mortimer but never glimpse the change taking place. Somewhere, somehow, the character has undergone alteration, but the playwright does not
explain.
To be sure, Marlowe has developed beyond the depiction of simply
fixed, unchanging characters. To be more precise, he has progressed
beyond the dead end technique (or lack of technique) reflected in John
Pickeryng's Horestes (pub. 1567), in which the title character is faced with
the burden of revenge upon his mother. To express this internal conflict,
Pickeryng has his character say nothing but includes the direction to his
actor, "Here Horestes sigheth hard." 20 Unable to find language to express
the inner turmoil, Pickeryng relies upon gesture and an actor's resourcefulness to evoke a sense of internal conflict by external signs. Though
Marlowe's attempt went beyond directed muteness, he, too, remained
uncertain in the depiction of a character's inner self.
••John Pickeryng, Horestes, ed. Daniel Seltzer (Oxford: Malone Society, 1962), ll.891-93
(Sig. O.i., verso ).
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English Renaissance drama, like so many ndeavors of the age, represents a break with what preceded it. arlowe's work, especially when
juxtaposed with Pickeryng's, displays an attempt to move beyond the
medieval schema; more accurately, perhaps, it reflects an attempt at the
replacement of one paradigm with another.
With this sketch as background, it is appropriate to focus on two instances of artistic problems in the attempt to render the inner life of
dramatic characters. Both problems exist in plays written at approximately the same time (ca. 1603}-Shakespeare's Angelo in Measure for
Measure and Heywood's Master Wendoll in A Woman Killed with Killd11ess. Each problem occurs when the dramatist attempts to render the
character's process of self-analy is. In each case, a basicaUy good man is
drawn to evil and unable to analyze (or the playwright to express) what
emotions govern him.
The portrayal of Angelo as an innocent in every sense of the word-in
terms both of experience and self-knowledge-tempted and overcome,
exists nowhere else in the Shakespeare canon. In the comedies, the major
or successful characters achieve fuller self-awareness. However, the
growth process involves no anguished introspection. In accord with the
nature of comedy, events and interaction with other characters tend to be
the primary causes of such development. Benedick's overhearing Beatrice's expression of real feeling for him allows his own admission-first to
himse lf then publicaUy-of his emotion. Antonio, in The Merchant, having
experienced others' concern for his welfare, arrives at an enlarged sense
of humanity. Though Shylock utters self-revelatory speeches, he feels no
internal conflict. Thus, while self-revelation might have gained him tragic
stature, his singleness of mind marks him as only a comic blocking character.
Though Othello may, like Angelo, see the devil as active in the person
of Desdemona, it remain~ true that he does not suffer the anguish of
self-doubt until the very end of the play. Only after Emilia reveals Iago's
treachery does Othello focus on himself. Earlier in the play he had
managed to suppress any sense of personal faults, his age, his race, as
causes for Desdemona's infidelity. Most important, Shake peare uses an
external source-Iago's rhetoric- to work Othello. One might see Iago as
another half of Othello's mind, his Bad Angel, but such a reading becomes,
of course, symbolic.
Although this is not the place to settle Leontes' motivation in the opening of The Winter's Tale, his mental processes are clear enough. We hear
of the youthful friendsh ip of Polixenes and Leontes. But they are no longer
youths. Leontes' sudden anger underscores that point. He thinks he sees
very clearly what is happening. As with OthelJo, w in the audience know
-or feel-different. One point connects the depiction of Leontes with
"AU Shakespeare references are to The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. C. B. Evans et al. (Boston:
Houghton-Mifflin, 1974).
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that of Angelo: At the inception of this emotion, Leontes says"} have
tremor cordis on me; my heart dances,/But not for joy; not joy"
( WF.2.110--111).2' That i , his recognition of this onset of emotion is intense and sudden. Having noted this, we should become aware of the
contrast: because he is convinced of the accuracy of his feelings, Leontes
suffers no self-doubt.
Perhaps the characters closest to Angelo in terms of inner turmoil are
Hamlet and Macbeth. Hamlet not only questions those around him but
himself on the basis of his own inaction. The key difference between
Hamlet and Angelo rests on the former's interaction with a number of
other characters and in the greater intellect Shakespeare creates in him.
Perhaps in part because Angelo is not the major character in the play, he
tends to be more isolated; in addition, his scope of thought is narrower. As
the play moves to an end, Hamlet forcefuJly proclaims a self-justifying
faith
in the external entity, Providence. Angelo's proclamation of faith in the
devil, "Let's write good angel on the devil's horn," does him no
good.
What then of Macbeth? At the point of the witches' prophecy Banquo
notes Macbeth's reaction, "Good si r, why do you start, and seem to
fear/Things that do sound so fair?" (Mac. I.3.51-52). One might assume
that in contrast to Banquo Macbeth is startled by the witches themselves.
Or one might assume that the prophecy has touched an ambitious chord
in the man. When, shortly after, Macbeth reveals his "horrible imaginings" of the future to include murder, we see that the witches indeed had
struck at his heart. Unlike Hamlet, Macbeth has a corporeal assistant in his
action. Lady Macbeth simplifies the act and its consequences sufficiently
to convince him to act. Unlike Angelo, Macbeth worries about the act
primarily in terms of its consequences: to oversimplify only somewhat,
when considering the act he fears the lack of tidiness regicide may effect
in his existence. Angelo is shocked, on the contrary, at the change which
has overtaken him during his temptation. This is an important distinction
of character focus. Set in what we call a problem play, Angelo has the
potential for tragedy in his search for self-knowledge; but, as I shall try to
demonstrate, given what was available to him, Shakespeare could deve lop
Angelo no further.
In contrast, one ground on which dramatists were sure of themselves
lay in the power of rhetoric to move or change character. Iago's transformation of Othello does not require summary here. At the end of King
Lear, after hearing Edgar's emotional description of their father's death,
Edmund, himself near death, says, "This speech of yours hath mov'd me /
And shall perchance do good" (Lr. V.3.199-200). In Cyril Tourneur's Revenger's Tragedy (1607), Vindice the revenger is sent by the Duke, whom
he means ultimately to kill, on a pander's mission. The object of his mission
is Vindice's own sister. (He is disguised.) Though their mother, Gratiana,
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turns away his initial proposition, after a long speech in which he extols
wealth, power, and luxury, the following takes place.
Gratiana: Oh, heavens, this overcomes me!
Vindice: [Aside] ot, I hope, already?
Gratiana: [Aside] It is too strong for me. Men
know, that know us,
We are so weak their words can over throw us.
(Il.l.104-107) 22

While character change has occured here, the causal element is rhetoric,
an external force (along with the imputed weaker nature of woman). The
artistic problem lay with the expression of passions when they worked
contrary to a character's concept of himself.
ln Measure for Measure, Angelo, the man who seemed stone, feels
himself moved to lust. Angelo's soliloquies represent some of Shakespeare's most intensely written dramatic speeches. With a staccato frenzy,
Angelo searches for cause:
What's this? What's this? Is this her fault, or mine?
and then he realizes:
ot she; nor does she tempt; but it is I.
Yet, still puzzled, he wonders:
Can it be
That modesty may more betray our sense
Than woman's lightness?
After this, he blames himself:
0 fie, fie, fie!
What dost thou? or what art thou, Angelo?
Dost thou desire her foully for those things
That make her good?
At last, Angelo concludes upon an external cause, the devil:
0 cunning enemy, that to catch a saint,
With saints dost bait thy hook!
(MM 11.2.162--181)

The pattern of Angelo's attempt at self-analysis progresses from shock at
"From The Reve11ger's Tragedy in Russell A. Fraser and Norman Rabkin, eds., Drama of the
E11glish Re11aissa11ce. (New York: Macmillan, 1976), Vol. Il.
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his own arousal, to an awareness that he is attracted to innocence rather
than impudence, and, finally, back to a traditional placing of fault on
external evil, the devil. The argument that this lame conclusion represents
a defense mechanism triggered by Angelo's pride: his arousal is not his
fault, or even necessarily that of Isabella, but a trick of a superior force,
collapses in his next soliloquy: a repetition of puzzled shock at his inability
to pray because of his recurring desire for Isabella. In addition, he confesses awareness of his pride.
yea, my gravity,
Wherein (let no man hear me) I talce pride,
Could I, with boot, change for
idle plume.

an

Angelo concludes acceptance of his lust:
Blood, thou ar t blood .
Le t"s write "good angel" on the devil's horn,
'Tis not the devil 's crest.
(MM 11.4.9-11, 15-17)
Shakespeare's aim is complex: the attempt to show the change in out-

look of a good (though inexperienced) man as a result of his attraction to
a good woman. Language reveals both the stone-cold Angelo and the
hot-blooded Angelo. However, the final process of change occurs offstage.
Although one might arraign Angelo with an inability to see into himself,
in all honesty, one must conclude that Shalcespeare was unable to analyze,
and therefor unable to recreate, the passions working within Angelo.
Shakespear was unable to do so because his age provided him with no
paradigm for such analysis. The portrayal of a man who goes counter to
his sense of himself was an impossibility. Shalcespeare invests a good deal
of poetic capital with very little return.
There does exist a verba l consistency in Angelo's reaction when he
learns of the Duke's imminent return. The man "pregnant" with learning,
"stamped" and "coined" as the Duke's deputy, now says:
This deed unshapes me quite, malces me
unpregnant
And dull to all proceedings.
After summarizing his dilemma, Angelo can conclude with little more
than one more recapitulation of his paralysis:
Alack, when once our grace we have forgot,
1othing goes right- we would, and we would
not.
(MM IV.4.20-21 , 33-34)
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To point out that Angelo's paralysis res mbles that of Claudius in the
prayer scene of Hamlet remains insufficient unless one also notes
Claudius' clear balancing of the rewards for his sin- the Qu n, the crown
-against eternal values. That is, Claudius' evaluative processes are clearly
developed and his passions !es central; additionalJy, Claudius focuses on
a primarily external situation. In contrast, Angelo's processes combine
moral value and passions; not simply intellective in nature, they a.re less
easy for Shakespeare to create. Though Angelo's " unmanning" in Act four
provides a verbal structure for his downfall, his begging for death in the
final ac t only repeats his inability to see the possibility for change, for
repentance (V.l.479--82). In contrast, Shakespeare's purely villainous
characte rs such as Iago and Edmund would undergo no tension here;
having no conscience they recognize only the efficiency of reason divorced from ethics. Each accepts himself as what he is. In this attempt at
depicting the complex dilemma of an ethically mixed character, Shakespeare failed to solve a technical and esthetic problem.
Consider the parallel example, Mas ter Wendoll of Heywood's A
Woma11 Killed with Ki11d11ess. Against his inclinations, Wendoll attempts
to seduce Anne Frankford, the wife of his host and benefactor.
As he enters, "melancholy" 23 (a stage direction that must have denoted
a conventional acting pose), Wendoll attempts first to drive away his lust
with a song, to pray, to deny himself the sight of Anne Frankford. All fails.
WendolJ describes himself as "hurried to my own destruction" (vi, 18-19),
and as a traitor to his friend Frankford; nonetheless, he concludes:
And yet I must. Then, Wendoll, be content;
Thus, villains, when they would, cannot repent
(vi, 52-53)

Wendoll himself is unable to articulate a reason for what is occurring.
Though he may be less eloquent than Angelo, both lack self-explanation.
Shakespeare's greater poetic ability does not carry him much further than
Heywood in exploring this mental state. either playwright had available
the psychological paradigm to construct the mental processes of a character who saw himself acting in a manner contradictory to his self-image.
The available paradigm, the humours theory of human behavior, failed
in this case. As J. P. Barn borough states, the humours theory collapsed by
the mid-seventeenth century, shortly after the writing of these two
plays.2 • Though Thomas Hobbes retained some elements of it, his exposition of human psychology in Leviatha11 (Book I, chapter iv) bears a different tack, one much more operative and analytic.
" Fraser and Rabkin, eds., Drama of the E 11g lish Re11aissa11ce, I. No act divisions appear in
the text.
"J. P. Bamborough, The Li/Ile World of Ma11 (London: Longmans, Green, 1952).
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Like Machiavelli, in that his work avoided conventional moral judgments, and perhaps working from the latter's generalizations about human nature as a fixed entity, Hobbes attempted to examine man's
behavior. In a very real sense, Hobbes represents one answer to the
Renaissance drive of man to know himself. Hobbes' transformation of the
primary thrust of this classical dictum b ears importance to the case at
hand. o longer need one strive to know oneself in relation to a set of
external ethical truth . "How do I measure up" becomes less important.
"How do I operate" is closer to the central question for Hobbes. This new
focus, this new paradigm, developed too late to serve Shakespeare or
Heywood, though one might assume that their attempts do suggest a
grasping after what Hobbes formulated. Their failure lies with the operative element.
Kuhn's notion of the pararugm assumes that scientific thinking, and
indeed-taking the theory at its fullest-the majority of our thinking, is
essentially inductive in nature. I have tried to suggest that artistic thinking
and development, too, is primarily inductive in nature. At certain times
an artist " plunging recklessly ahead," as Hartt put it, will fail because the
necessary raw material, the necessary paradigm, is lacking.
Let me cite, briefly, three other examples of what I believe to be similar
instances in English Renaissance drama. Thomas Dekker's The Shoemaker's Holiday (1599), a very succes ful comedy, expresses a curious ambivalence about money, love, and social class. One may assume that Dekker
regarded wealth as such, often acquired through trade, with or without
attendant hard work, as liable to und rmine the ordered hierarchy of
social class. Interestingly, Dekker straddles both sides. Class is at once
important and not important; money at once gauche and a key to happiness. This ambivalence may reflect Dekker's state of arrest resulting from
his awareness of social paradigm change. Dekker perceived the new
wealth and consequently new power in what had been the lower classes.
Though he supported the existing system, he supported these virtuous,
hard-working, and clever new rich as well. This ambivalence in attitudes
toward social class in 11ie Shoemaker's Holiday serves to illustrate my
point.
Another example is A rde11 of Feversham (anon. , 1592), the very popular
domestic tragedy. The play contains a numb r of what seem to us hilarious
scenes depicting the misadven ture of Black Will and Shakebag, two murderers hired to kill Arden. Even taking into account the conventional
interplay of comic and serious, these scenes seem at odds with the overall
serious tone of the play. Yet in an epilogu the author writes:
Gentlemen, we hope you'll pardon this naked
tragedy,
Wherein no filed points are foisted in
To make it gracious to the ear or eye;
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For simple truth is gracious enough,
And needs no other points of glozing stuff.••
Taken at face value, as they ask to be, these lines suggest the author's
guiding principle should be categorized as realism--0r perhaps ethical
realism. Yet realism did not mature until centuries later. If we view the
problems of Arden in terms of a nascent paradigm, we may understand
them more clearly.
A last brief example exists in the plays of John Ford. In the 1620s and
1630s Ford produced a number of tragedies (The Broken Heart, Perkin
Warbeck, Tis Pity She's a Whore) which examine the ends of men and
women who violate the norms of society by acts of incest, adultery, political rebellion. However, Ford's attempt to examine the motives and bearing of his characters seems shackled by conventional concepts and,
therefore, conventional language. Might not Ford, too, have been a writer
lacking a paradigm? That is, Ford seems objective or even at times seems
to favor his characters, lawbreakers though they are. Yet the language and
concepts available suggest condemnation.
A contrast to the incomplete development of Angelo and Wendoll exists
in Milton's Satan. Paradise Lost may be an epic, but no one would deny
its dramatic qualities. Dialogue not only informs it, but also develops
character. Sollioquy, too, develops character and values. In the dialogue
in Hell, we view Satan the political manipulator. In Books IV and IX we
see Satan the introspective, troubled being.
In the case of Angelo and Wendoll, agony arises from an essentially
good nature drawn to evil. In Satan's case, the vestiges of his angelic self,
attracted to beauty and goodness, produce his agony. The important element in Milton's depiction of Satan lies in Satan's recognition of his own
guilt and his simultaneous conviction that God is, nonetheless, to blame.
Thus he admits:
. . . Pride and worse Ambition threw me down
Warring in Heav'n against Heav'n's matchless
King:

Ah wherefore! he
return From me.••

deserved

no

such

Then Satan adds, "Be then his Love accurst, since love or hate,/ To me
alike, it deals eternal woe." But the Ironic limitations of Milton's doctrinal
values force Satan to admit reality. Echoing Marlowe's Faustus (" ay,
Faustus, curse thyself."), Satan adds," ay curs'd be thou; since against his
thy will/ Chose freely what it now so justly rues" (IV: 69-70; 71-72). Once
,.Drama of the English Renaissance, I.
"John Milton, Paradise Last, in The Stude11t 's Milton, ed. F. A. Patterson ( ew York: Crofts,
1946), IV:40-43. Subsequent references will be parenthetical by book and line numbers.
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he has accepted his own fault, Satan faces the choice of repentance or
continued defiance. His torment defines him, "my self am hell." To repeat:
Satan's con8ict is of the same type as that of Angelo and Wendoll. It arises
in each case from a sense of guilt.
Though one must acknowledge the conceptual difference between Satan's spiritual essence and the human nature of Angelo and Wendoll, at
the same time, the resources of the poetic creators are the same. This is
an important point. Milton may be creating the divine persons of the
Trinity, angels (both maculate and unfallen), and the first humans. Even
so, though he is guided by Biblical doctrine, Milton's embodiment of these
entities is undeniably human . He has no alternative. In the widest application of Kuhn's concept, the human paradigm governs, is, the reality of our
sense of being, in the widest implications of that term. It follows, then, that
the depiction of Satan's process of self-analysis is comparable to the depiction of Angelo and Wendoll.
That comparison reveals Milton's superior development of the inner
dynamics and complexities of character. Angelo's capitulation ("Let's
write good angel on the devil's horn.') is an easy descent into hypocrisy.
Wendoll's surrender ("And yet I must.') seems hapless, willy-nilly. Satan
balances guilt with defiance, turns pain into strength, and concludes, "Evil
be thou my good" (IV:110). One must acknowledge the thematic reality
Milton expresses: fundamentally Satan must admit God's superiority, must
accept that reality. Milton's success lies in his embodiment of that reality
within Satan's consciousness. This unconquerable will characterized as
"neither joy nor love, but fierce desire" (IV:509) motivates Satan despite
the pain of loss. As a consequence, Satan is able to say in Book IX:
. . . the more I see
Pleasures about me, so much more I feel
Torment within me, as from the hateful siege
Of contraries; all good to me becomes
Bane
(IX:119-23)

The balanced conRict between knowledge of loss of good and deprived
acceptance of evil is portrayed convincingly. or can one contrast Satan
with Angelo (and Wendoll) in terms of essential goodness. For, although
Satan has arrived at the conclusion that evil is his good, his inextinguishable angelic essence keeps alive in him an awe of God, an attraction to
beauty-that of Eden, of Adam and Eve-an awareness, that is, of the
overriding scheme of things. Thus Milton's problem does resemble that of
Shakespeare and Heywood.
Let me suggest, then, that the post-Hobbesian paradigm fostered more
complex expression of human nature. Milton, the last of the Renaissance
poets, writing the last great Renaissance poem, was participating in this
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post-Renaissance paradigm of the human mind. My point includes the
assertion that the identification of individual talent as a primary cause of
artistic excellence oversimplifies the situation. One cannot ignore talent
(even writing this seems fatuous); all poets are not created equal. Nonetheless, the writer intersects with his age, becomes part of the emerging
world view. Change in art (note I did not say progress) occurs as a result
of this sort of dynamic interplay.
I see two conclusions from all this. The first, accepting the notion of the
paradigm as relevant to artistic creation as well as scientific, posits an
evolutionary and dialectic situation. The greater artists (the more reckless
perhaps?) react against the dominant paradigm- test it, probe it, attempt
to extend it, to find its limits-any or all of these relations may exist at a
given time, though not necessarily entirely consciously. For an artist the
problem of an exhausted paradigm without an adequate alternative may
lead to the sorts of inchoate results I have described above. Though we
may choose to label art evolutionary, in doing so we must bear in mind
the total significance of that metaphor. Evolution is fraught with dead
ends, failures, extinctions; the dinosaurs exist only in museums. Some
artistic efforts are extinct; some exist only in museums.
The second conclusion has to do with the historical sense of period. All
too often in dealing with literature, the historical approach has followed
roughly the following pattern of thought: This is what the age believed;
therefore, this is what such and such a work means. Such abstracting
achieves a certain efficient clarity; the mess of everyday existence
becomes simplified for us. But such a way of thinking denies, or at least
weakens, a sense of the dynamic of history. And, as Wilbur Sanders asserts,
the fallacy of "the orthodoxy of an age .. . commits one too deeply to the
statistico-factual [sic] criterion, and neglects the interpretative dimension."27 An example of my point appears in a line from Ben Jonson's
Everyman i11 His Humour (revised version, ca. 1610). Young Edward
Knowell refers to "Drake's old ship at Deptford" (1.2.103-4).28 This line,
written roughly thirty years after Drake's circumnavigation of the globe
(1578), reflects a changed attitude. To us, Drake's voyage signifies a "typical" Renaissance triumph. To young Knowell, Drake's "old ship" represents at best nostalgia, at worst something close to a tourist attractiona curio. A line such as this reminds us that even within what we define as
a discrete historical period, the dynamic of human thought and events
continued.
Artists participate in this dynamic, often at the forefront, plunging
recklessly ahead. At times, they occupy an interstitial-not transitional"Wilbur Sanders, The Dramatist a11d the Received Idea (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1968), p. 10.
"Ben Jonson, Everyma11 i11 His Humour, ed. J. W. Lever (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press,
1967).
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position. Having discarded certain paradigms, but not operating within
any replacement paradigms, these artists remain fixed, as it were, in an
inchoate state . So it was at the start of the seventeenth century. Dramatic
artists were at the end of the Aristoteliru;i paradigm of drama as " the
actions of men" and were attempting to portray the inner self of " m en
in action." At this point, the old pattern of the mind proved inadequate.
Hobbes· new mechanistic pattern which stressed operation would provide
the analytic basis for more complex artistic expression of the human mind.

